<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>Sec on Ely Clover</title><link>https://stg.elyclover.com/categories/sec/</link><description>Recent content in Sec on Ely Clover</description><generator>Hugo -- gohugo.io</generator><language>en-us</language><managingEditor>kevin@elyclover.com (Kevin Holmes)</managingEditor><webMaster>kevin@elyclover.com (Kevin Holmes)</webMaster><copyright>© 2026 Kevin Holmes</copyright><lastBuildDate>Tue, 08 Aug 2023 10:00:00 +0000</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://stg.elyclover.com/categories/sec/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>Google Artifact Registry is replacing Container Registry</title><link>https://stg.elyclover.com/posts/gcr-to-gar-transition/</link><pubDate>Tue, 08 Aug 2023 10:00:00 +0000</pubDate><author>kevin@elyclover.com (Kevin Holmes)</author><guid>https://stg.elyclover.com/posts/gcr-to-gar-transition/</guid><description>&lt;p&gt;You may have seen the warnings in your Google Console recently: the Google Container Registry (GCR) product will be deprecated in May of 2023 in favor of &lt;a href="https://cloud.google.com/artifact-registry" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer"&gt;Google Artifact Registry&lt;/a&gt; (GAR.)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Whenever I see these kinds of warnings as an engineer on a DevOps, Infrastructure, or Platform team (how many ways can we be classified?!), my heart tends to drop into my stomach a bit because it means a vendor has tossed another bundle of work onto what&amp;rsquo;s likely an already overloaded plate. Since we&amp;rsquo;re all trying to think more positively these days (I hope), let&amp;rsquo;s discuss why this can be a Good Thing (tm) for all of us, especially when considering DevSecOps and Cybersecurity principles within a Google Cloud environment.&lt;/p&gt;</description></item><item><title>Eliminating Service Account keys in self-hosted Actions CI/CD environments</title><link>https://stg.elyclover.com/posts/gha-with-arc-eliminating-service-account-keys/</link><pubDate>Wed, 02 Aug 2023 10:00:00 +0000</pubDate><author>kevin@elyclover.com (Kevin Holmes)</author><guid>https://stg.elyclover.com/posts/gha-with-arc-eliminating-service-account-keys/</guid><description>&lt;p&gt;If you&amp;rsquo;ve been paying attention to the Federal guidance from the Whitehouse over the last couple of years, there&amp;rsquo;s a slice dedicated to securing the software supply chain. This shift isn&amp;rsquo;t a big shocker to anyone keen on cybersecurity or national security topics. Supply chains for physical goods are the lifeblood of a nation&amp;rsquo;s economy, the same goes for non-tangible goods like software and the platforms it runs on. If you&amp;rsquo;ve been in the field for a while, I&amp;rsquo;m sure you&amp;rsquo;ve heard about the Solarwinds &lt;a href="https://www.npr.org/2021/04/16/985439655/a-worst-nightmare-cyberattack-the-untold-story-of-the-solarwinds-hack" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer"&gt;hack&lt;/a&gt;, and plenty of others in the past could have been better publicized, considering how nefarious they were.&lt;/p&gt;</description></item><item><title>When should I self-host GitHub Actions runners? (part 1)</title><link>https://stg.elyclover.com/posts/self-hosted-github-actions-thoughts-part-1/</link><pubDate>Mon, 31 Jul 2023 10:00:00 +0000</pubDate><author>kevin@elyclover.com (Kevin Holmes)</author><guid>https://stg.elyclover.com/posts/self-hosted-github-actions-thoughts-part-1/</guid><description>&lt;p&gt;As 2023 flies by and the Cybersecurity incidents making headlines continue to roll in, I would like to discuss self-hosting your own GitHub Actions infrastructure.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;First, I always encourage teams to use hosted solutions &lt;em&gt;when possible&lt;/em&gt;. The keyword here, and in most good systems engineering, is &amp;ldquo;where possible&amp;rdquo; - which can be the hardest part for teams to isolate and identify given their backstory, knowledge gaps, and regulatory environment(s). For instance, I&amp;rsquo;ve seen powerful DevOps, Infrastructure, or Platform engineering teams decide to self-host Actions Runner environments because they have the resources and buy-in from management. However, there&amp;rsquo;s no strong reason beyond the team wanting to do it and thinking they have the free cycles. This kind of thinking is a classic trap for engineering teams because the objective is a sexy one, and I can&amp;rsquo;t deny that. GitHub Actions are getting more popular by the day, and it&amp;rsquo;s certainly a hot topic among teams already using GitHub for source control or considering the move from competing well-established ecosystems like GitLab, Gerrit, Jenkins, and similar alternatives.&lt;/p&gt;</description></item><item><title>Governance of 3rd party GitHub Actions in GHES instances</title><link>https://stg.elyclover.com/posts/governance-of-3rd-party-gh-actions/</link><pubDate>Fri, 28 Jul 2023 10:00:00 +0000</pubDate><author>kevin@elyclover.com (Kevin Holmes)</author><guid>https://stg.elyclover.com/posts/governance-of-3rd-party-gh-actions/</guid><description>&lt;p&gt;After spending a few years using GitHub Actions in Open Source, Commercial, and FedRamp environments, I wanted to share some of my takeaways for a few options on how to provide governance over what Actions you allow to be used within your self-hosted GHES and Actions runner instances. This article will focus on government or commercial users self-hosting source code (GHES) and the Actions runners in their secured environments.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;There are two paths if you boil this down:&lt;/p&gt;</description></item></channel></rss>